Santa Clara Law

Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

4-22-1986

California Death Penalty Laws and the California
Supreme Court: A Ten Year Perspective
Gerald F. Uelmen
Santa Clara University School of Law, guelmen@scu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs
Part of the Law Commons
Automated Citation
Gerald F. Uelmen, California Death Penalty Laws and the California Supreme Court: A Ten Year Perspective (1986),
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/799

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

---------i-'.,---~,,~··-·"---·· -~~;;_;

rlI;i\.Ii'=_~1{ ZJi~-~;1 ]..)~. ~_£_~:. ;'"

SANTA CLAnA, CALHt"

CALIFORNIA DEATH fENALTY
AHQ

~

~

CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT:

A~

~

PERSPECTIVE

By Gerald

,F.

Uelmen

Professor of Law,
Loyola Law School

PREPARED FOR THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY OF THE CALIFORNIA
LEGISLATURE, SENATOR BILL LOCKYER, CHAIRMAN, UNDER THE AUSPICES
, OF THE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT, UNIVERSITY OF
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, DR. LARRY L. BERG, DIRECTOR.

NOT FOR RELEASE PRIOR TO APRIL 22, 1986

.... '.y

~"'

95Ui)~,

kpc.

{toe
c~

A:<5'
I~ Q-~

-\'

CONTENTS

. . ..- . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . . . . .1
HISTORICAL AND STATISTICAL OVERVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • .6
THE CONVICTION OF GUILT .••••..•••••• . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
THE FINDING OF SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES •. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
A.
The 1977 Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
B.
The 1978 Briggs Initiative. · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .32
THE DETERMINATION OF PENALTy •••• · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
A.
The 1977 Law ............... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .48
.53
B.
The 1978 Briggs Initiative. · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I. INTRODUCTION •.••..••.•••..••.••.••••
II.
III.
IV.

V.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 60
APPENDIX:

... .. . ... . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . .. . . . . . .66
INITIATIVE. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

1977 DEATH PENALTY LAW.
1978 BRIGGS

CALIFORNIA DEATH PENALTY LAWS
AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COVRT;
A TEN YEAR PERSPECTIVE
By Gerald F.
I.

Uelmen~

Introduction
On December 27, 1976, in a unanimous opinion, the California

Supreme Court declared that the California death penalty law
enacted in 1973 was unconstitutional..
Court (1976) 18 C.3d 420.

Rockwell v. Superior

The Rockwell opinion surprised no one,

since the U.S. Supreme Court had already held that "mandatory"
death penalty laws were unconstitutipnal in Gregg v. Georgia
"

(1976) 428 U.S. 153, Woodson v. N. Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280,
and Roberts v.
that year.

Louisian~

(1976) 428 U.S. 325, decided earlier

The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the "guided discretion"

death penalty laws of Georgia, Florida and Texas, however, under
Which the legislature defined specific "special circumstances"
justifying imposition of the death penalty, and required the
judge or jury to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors in
deciding whether death is the appropriate penalty.

The

California legislature responded by enacting a new death penalty
law carefully modelled upon the laws upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court.

The new death penalty law was authored by'then-Senator

George Deukmejian.

The bill was vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown,

*Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. As of
July 1, 1986, Dean, School of Law, Santa Clara University.
The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of
Michael Millman, Director, California Appellate Project
who reviewed a draft, and Robin Gertler, Loyola Law Sch~OI
'86, who compiled the appendix.
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but re-enacted over his veto and became effective August 11,
1977 . . Since the new law could not be applied "retroactively" to
crimes committed before the date of its enactment, California
"started over" on August 11, 1977 in terms of its efforts to
implement the death penalty.
Fifteen months later, in November of 1978, the 1977 death
penalty law was repealed and replaced by a new death penalty law
which broadly expanded the categories of cases in which the death
penalty could be imposed.

The initiative measure, popularly

known as the "Briggs Initiative" for its author, Senator John
Briggs, was passed by a 72% majority of the electorate.
Both the 1977 death penalty law and the 1978 Briggs
Initiative require three separate factual determinations before a
judgment of death may be imposed.

First, the defendant must be

convicted of an offense which carries a possible death penalty.
Such offenses include first degree murder, sabotage, treason,
perjury procuring the execution of an innocent person, train
wrecking, . and deadly assault by one serving a life term.

Second,

if the defendant is convicted of first degree murder, the finder
of fact must conclude that one of the "special circumstances"
defined by statute was true.

If a "special circumstance" is

found, a sentence of death or life imprisonment without
possibility of parole must be imposed.

otherwise, an ordinary

sentence of 25 years to life, with eligibility for parole, will
be imposGd.

A conviction of sabotage, treason, perjury procuring

2

execution, train wrecking or assault by a lifo termer does not
require additional "special circumstances," but virtually all
death penalty cases in California have involved a charge of first
degree murder.

The third factual determination required is

whether aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating
circumstances, in which case a penalty of death may be imposed.
Each of these factual determinations must be upheld upon
review by the California. supreme Court before a sentence of death
can be carried out.

As of March 1, 1986, a total of 54 death

penalty judgments have been reviewed with finality on automatic
appeal to the California Supreme Court.

(The grant of a petition

for rehearing prevents a decision becoming final, so no

deci~ions

in which a rehearing has been granted are included in this total.
Decisions on writs have also been excluded).

The purpose of this

paper is to present an analysis of these decisions, and their
impact upon the California death penalty law.
Clearly, there is a widespread public perception that the
decisions of the California Supreme Court have frustrated
implementation of the death penalty in California.

The record of

the outcome of the 54 cases--5l reversals and 3 affirmances--is
frequently cited to bolster that perception.

The issue is much

more complex than a simplistic box score can reveal, however.
This paper will analyze the 54 cases from two perspectives.
First, the cases will be analyzed in terms of the factual
determinations being reviewed: the conviction of guilt, the
finding of special circumstances, and the determination of
penalty.

Second, the cases will be analyzed in terms of which

3
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death penalty law waa utilized.

Significant differences and

patterns emerge at both levels ot this analysis.

Hopefully,

these differences and patterns, which are summarized in Table 1,
will assist in identifying problems which are amenable to
legislative solution.

'\

)
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TABLE 1

Q'- OY!;~Qme Qf ~~11'Q[n1~ §u:g[~m~ CQY);:!; l2~gisions
Reviewing Dea!;h Penalty Jydgments, 1979-198~.

§ymrn~n;:y

conviction
of Guilt

Finding of Special
circumstances

Determination
of Penalty

AFF.

REV.

AFF.

1977 Death
Penalty Law

16

11

12

4

3

9

1978 Briggs

20

7

5

16

0

6

36

18

17

20

3

15

REV.

AFF.

REV.

Initiative

TOTAL

5

-,-:-

~
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II.

Historical and statistical OVerview
A ten year

perBpecti~e

hardly panoramic.

ori California death penalty laws is

The death penalty goes back to California's

beginning as a state, and a brief overview of its history will

\

help put the past ten years in sharper focus.
We will never know how many Californians were officially
executed during the first forty-one years of California
statehood.

Executions were performed by County authorities, and

no one ever bothered to count heads.

This situation was remedied

by the state legislature in 1891, with the enactment of the
following provision:
"A judgment of death must be executed within the walls
of one of the stat~ Prisons designated by the Court by
which judgment is rendered.. The Warden of the state
Prison where the execution is to take place must be
present at the execution and must invite the presence
of a physician, the Attorney-General of the state, and
at least twelve reputable citizens, to be selected by
him; and he shall, at the request of the defendant,
permit such ministers of the gospel, not exceeding two,
as the defendant may name, and any persons, relatives
or friends, not to exceed five, to be present at the
execution, together with such peace officers as he may
think expedient, to witness the execution. But no
other persons than those mentioned in this section can
be present at the execution, nor can any person under
age be allowed to witness the same." (Cal. stats.,
1891, ch. 191, § '9, p. 274; Now Cal. Pen. Code §§ 360305) •

After 1893, all hangings were performed by the state authorities,
either at Folsom Prison or San Quentin.

A total of 306 prisoners

were executed by hanging during the forty-five year period ending
in 1938, at an average rate of seven per year.

Ninety-two were

hanged at Folsom, while 214 met the end of the rope at San
Quentin.

Nearly all had been convicted of murder.

Only three

6
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had been convicted of assault by one carving a life sentence,
which became a capital offense in 1901, and three were hung for
kidnapping, which was made a capital offense in 1933.

San

Quentin did not record the ethnic background of the executed, but
the records of hangings at Folsom reveal that the vast majority
of those executed were white.

More death sentences came from Los

Angeles than any other county in the state during this period.
Los Angeles county supplied 55, while Sacramento County supplied
34 and San Francisco county 33.

Most of those who were hung in

California sought appellate review of their convictions, but at
least 74 went to the gallows with no review of their conviction
by an appellate court.

Automatic review of death penalty cases

by the California Supreme Court was not instituted until April,
1936.

Lethal gas was adopted as the means of execution for

California on August 27, 1937.

Those who were sentenced prior to

that date were still hung, so the last legal hanging in
California was not performed at San Quentin until May 1, 1942,
when l-taj or Raymond Lisenba, also known as "Rattlesnake James",
was hung.

Lisenba was convicted of murdering his wife by

sticking her foot in a box full of diamond-back rattlesnakes.
His challenge to the admissibility of a confession following 32
hours of relay questioning was denied by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Lisbena v. california (1941) 314 U.S. 219.
The first person to die in California's gas chamber at San
,Quentin was Albert Kessell, a Sacramento murderer, who was
executed on December 2.' 1938.

Since that day, 191 men and 4

women have died in the San Quentin gas chamber.

7

Executions

proceeded

at

an average rata of eight per year during the twenty-

year period ending in 195B.

While appeals were automatic, the

•. reen the pronouncement of sentence and actual
average delay bet ..
execution was less than two years.
The ethnic distribution of the 195 persons who died in the
California gas chamber differs little from the earlier data
concerning hangings.

Seventy-five percent were "white",

including B% with spanish surnames.
Blacks.

Twenty-three percent were

Los Angeles county again led the parade, with 45

executions.

Sacramento supplied 22, while only 15 were committed

for execution from San Francisco.
Under the California constitution adopted in lB79, clem~ncY
power was curiously distributed among the executive, legislative
and judicial branches.

Article VII, section I provided:

"The Governor shall have the power to grant reprieve,
pardons, and commutations of sentence, after
conviction, for all offenses except treason and cases
of impeachment, upon such conditions and with such
restrictions and limitations, as he may think proper,
subject to such regulations as may be provided by law
relative to the manner of applying for pardons. upon
conviction for treason, the Governor shall have power
to suspend the execution of the sentence until the case
shall be reported to the Legislature at its next
meeting when the Legislature shall either pardon
direct the execution of the sentence, or grant at
further reprieve~ The Governor shall cOIt\Il\unicate to
the Legislature, at the beginning of every session
every case of reprieve or pardon granted, stating the
name of the convict, the crime of which he was
convicted, the sentence, its date, the date of the
pardon or reprieve, and the reasons for granting the
same. Neither the Governor nor the Legislature shall
have power,to grant pardons, or commutations of sentence, ~n any case where the convict has been twice
convicted of felony, unless upon the written
recommendation of a majority of the judges of the
supreme Court." (Revised and Renumbered as Art. IV
§ B of the California Constitution in 1966).
'

!I

-----"----------'
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While no one has ever been sentenced to death for treason in a
California state court, there have been many instances of twiceconvicted felons sentenced to death.

A study of 97 persons

executed between 1938 and 1953 indicated that 51.6% had been in
prison one or more times prior to the conviction for which they
were executed.
53,"

u.

(Carter, "Capital PUnishment in California, 1938-

cal. School of criminology, 1953).

There is no recorded

example of the state supreme Court recommending clemency of a
twice-convicted felon, however.

An

application by Warren K.

Billings, who was convicted of the San Francisco Preparedness Day
Parade bombing with Tom lfooney, was denied by the Supreme Court
in 1930.

In Re Billings (1930) 210 Cal. 669.

The power of executive clemency was used sparingly by
California governors.

Earl Warren presided over 85 executions

during his eleven years as California Governor.
clemency in only 8 cases.

He granted

Governor Goodwin Knight exercised

clemency in 6 cases, allowing the execution of 41 others during
his five years in office.

A dramatic change took place in 1959 ,

when Edmund G. "pat" Brown became Governor.

Although he had

served as District Attorney of San Francisco and California
Attorney-General, Brown was philosophically opposed to the death
penalty.

The most difficult case confronting him was that of

Caryl Chessman, who had been on San Quentin's death row since
1948 after being convicted of kidnapping in Los Angeles County.

Since Chessman was a twice-convicted felon, Brown could not
commute Chessman's d8ath sentence without Supreme Court appr ova I .

!

I'

But he could grant a stay.

In 1960, he stayed the execution for

9
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sixty days and called upon the legislature to repeal the death
penalty.

The legislature refused, and Chessman was executed on

May 2, 1960.

Only 35 executions took place while Brown was

governor, the last in January of 1963.

He exercised the

commutation power in 23 cases, or 40% of the cases that came
before him.
Since Brown left office in 1967, only one execution has
occurred in California.

Four months after Ronald Reagan's

election as Governor, Aaron Mitchell, a black man convicted of a
Sacramento murder, was executed on April 12, 1967.

The

moratorium on executions since that time has been judicially
imposed.
Actually, the judicial moratorium began in 1964, with the
case of People v. Morse (1964) 60

~3-\
cal.2d~.

The california

Supreme Court held that it was error to instruct a jury deciding
the death penalty that, if they do not sentence the defendant to
death, he might be paroled after seven years.

This necessitated

new penalty trials for all prisoners on death row.

Four years

later, the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Witherspoon v. Illinoi§
(1968) 391 U.S. 510 also required the wholesale re-trial of the
penalty proceedings of those awaiting execution
, , because of the
exclusion of jurors with general objections to the death penaltyBy December 31, 1971, California had 105 prisoners on death roW,
awaiting the final ruling on the ultimate constitutional
question:

Does the death penalty itself violate the

constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment?

\
\
II

The answer came on February 18, 1972 in People v. Anderson, 6
\
!

\

!
i
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---..

-

Cal.3d 628.

writing for a majority of six (only Justice McComb

dissented), Chief Justice Donald wright held:
"capital punishment is both cruel and unusual as those
terms are defined under Article I, section 6 of the
California constitution, and that therefore, death may
not be exacted as punishment for crime in this state."
Governor Reagan was subsequently quoted as regretting the
appointment of Chief Justice Wright as his "biggest mistake".
Among the more notorious occupants of "death row" who escaped
execution by virtue of the Anderson decision were Charles Manson ,
leader of the cult which committed the grisly murders of Sharon
Tate and her friends; Sirhan Sirhan, who assassinated Robert F.
Kennedy in 1968; and Gregory u. powell, convicted of the
execution murder of a Los Angeles police officer in an onion
field near Bakersfield.

public outrage over the opinion was

expressed in the quick enactment of a constitutional amendment
declaring that the death penalty is neither cruel nor unusual
punishment.

Calif. const., Art. I,

§

27.

proposition 17 was

enacted by a 67% majority in the election of November 7, 1972.
Meanwhile, the united states supreme Court handed down nine
separate opinions in the case of Furman v. Georgia, 408 u.s. 238
on June 29, 1972.

The opinions were widely interpreted as

prohibiting discretion in the imposition of the death penalty.
In 1973, the california legislature responded to the mandate of
Proposition 17 and the generallY accepted interpretation of
Furman by enacting a mandatory death penalty law, requiring that
the death penalty be imposed in all cases of contract killings,
murders of police officers or crime witnesses, multiple killings,

11
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and murders during commission of rape, robbery, burglary,
kidnapping or child molestation.

During the next three years,

another fifty persons were sentenced to death in California under
this law.
In 1976, the united states Supreme Court held that a
mandatory death penalty was unconstitutional in Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153 (1976) and its companion cases.

California was

among the twenty states that had enacted mandatory death penalty
laws.

The California Supreme Court declared the 1973 mandatory

law unconstitutional in a unanimous opinion on December 7, 1976.
Rockwell v. superior Court, 18 Cal.3d 420 (1976).
The subsequent enactment of the 1977 death penalty law
the 1978 Briggs Initiative has already been recounted.

~nd

From

August 11, 1977 through December 31, 1985, a total of 214
judgments of death were entered in California courts.
The geographical distribution of death penalty judgments is
consistent with earlier experience.
Los Angeles county.

Nearly one-third came from

San Bernardino County is in second place,

followed by Orange County and Sacramento County.
ranks a distant seventh.

San Francisco

The ethnic distribution of death

judgments since 1978 reflects a higher proportion of minorities
than any previous time in California history.

Forty-five percent

were Caucasian, 39% Black, 12% Hispanic and 4% Asian or Native
American.
The nUmber of judgments has declined dramatically since
hitting a peak of 40 in 1981.

In 1985, the Supreme Court

reviewed more cases than death judgments were entered, thus

12

posting the first reduction in the backlog of undecided cases
that had accumulated.

The numbers of judgments and Supreme Court

decisions for each year are compiled in Table 2.

The "backlog"

does not reflect four suicides on California's death row since
1978.

13

Table 2
California SUQreme Court Di,sQosition of Death

J:udgm~n~s,

J.27~-

l~

Death
Judgments

Year
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
TOTALS

*
**

Suprema
Court Decisions

"Backlog"

7
20
24
40
39
37
29
18

0
2
6*
3
7
5
10
23**

7
25
43
80
112
144
163
158

214

56

158

Includes one case ·transferred to Court of Appeal for
disposition.
Includes one case disposed on Writ

14

of Habeas Corpus.

The initial delays in catching up on the backlog are not
unique to California.

The same pattern is a national phenomenon.

Table 3 shows the number of death penalty judgments entered
throughout the united states for each year since 1975, the number
of executions carried out, and the growth in the national death
row population since 1980.

The number on death row awaiting

execution is substantially less than the total of death judgments

,
i

j

reduced by executions because the death row population is reduced
each year by suicides, other deaths, commutations, and court
reversals.

Despite these reductions, the national death row

population has increased by approximately 180 during each of the
three past years.

15
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Table 3

u. S. Execution of Death Judgments,

I

"

:

~

"

Year

Death
Judgments,

1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

322
249
159
209
172
200
250
284
259
280
323'

0
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
5
21
18

2707

50

TOTALS

Executions

I

!:
I

I

I,

I·

!:
,

I

!!
i'

I

~

I

:

:

I
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1975-1985.

Death Row
Population

718
924
1137
1289
1464
1642

III. Th9 Conviction Qf Guilt
Of the 54 death penalty judgments reviewed with finality by
the California Supreme Court since 1979, the conviction of guilt
of first degree murder has been affirmed in 36, or 67% of the
cases.

The rate of affirmance is actually higher for cases

reviewed under the 1978 Briggs Initiative (20 out of 27, or 74%)
than for cases reviewed under the 1977 death penalty law (16 out
of 27, or 59%).

A sUbstantial proportion of the affirmances are

by a unanimous Court (32 out of 36, or 89%).
This rate of affirmance might be compared to the overall
rate of affirmance for other criminal appeals brought to the
Supreme Court by defendants.

That rate has varied in recent

years from 69% in fiscal year 1"981-82 to 41% in 1983-84.
comparison might be misleading, however.

Such a

Other criminal appeals

are self-selected by the Court, so a low rate of affirmance can
be anticipated.

Ordinarily, the Court does not grant a hearing

unless it sees a potential problem with the lower court ruling.
All death penalty judgments are automatically reviewed by the
Court, however.

Thus, it might be more meaningful to compare the

rate of affirmance to the affirmance rate for all criminal
appeals heard by the Courts of Appeal.

That rate is much higher.

In fiscal year 1983-84, 76% of the criminal convictions reviewed
by the Courts of Appeal were affirmed in full, while another 15%
were affirmed with modifications.

This affirmance rate of 91% is

substantially higher than comparable rates for intermediate
appellate courts in other states, such as Texas (83%), New Jersey

17

(84%), and Illinois

(77~).

The rate may vary significantly among

various divisions of the Courts of Appeal, however.

A 1984 study

co-authored by this author disclosed that the affirmance rate for
criminal appeals heard by the seven divisions of the Second
District Court of Appeal varied from 73% to 97%.

(Kanner &

Uelmen, "Random Assignment, Random Justice," 6 Los Angeles
Lawyer, No. 11, p. 10, Feb., 1984).

A recent study of criminal

appeals processed by the First District Court of Appeal concluded
that the high rate of affirmance in intermediate criminal appeals
is attributable to the harmless error rule and the sUbstantial
evidence rule, perceived as "norms of affirmance" by appellate
justices.

(Davies, "Affirmed:

A study of Criminal Appeals and

Decision-Making Norms in a California Court of Appeal," 1982 Am.
Bar Found. Res. J.543).· Clearly, these rules are not viewed as
"norms of affirmance" in death penalty cases.

Judges are much

more likely to resolve doubts in favor of the accused in a case
where the death penalty has been imposed.

This is not a

phenomenon unique to the California Supreme Court·.

The same

phenomenon has long been observed in the u.s. Supreme Court.
(Prettyman, Death and the Supreme Court 1961).
Thus, the California Supreme Court's rate of affirmance of
the conviction of guilt in death penalty cases is higher than its
rate of affirmance in non-death cases, but lower than the rate of
affirmance of the California Courts of Appeal in non-death cases.
How does it compare with the rate in death penalty cases reviewed
by the Supreme Courts of other states?

While data has not been

compiled in many other states, figures are available for the

18
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period 1972-1982 in Florida.

Florida'c 1972 doath penalty law

u.s. Supreme Court
428 u.s. 242), so the

was upheld by the

in 1976 (PrQffitt

Florida (1976)

Flo~ida

VI

Supreme Court has

reviewed more death penalty judgments in recent years than any
other court.

Of 145 cases reviewed up to 1982, a total of 70

were reversed, but only 20 of these were remanded for new trials
on the issue of guilt.
death penalty only.

The other 50 cases were reversals of the

Thus, the comparable rate of affirmance of

, i,

the conviction of guilt in death penalty cases for the Florida
Supreme Court is 85%, substantially higher than the 67% posted by
the California supreme Court.

(Radelet & Vandiver, "The Florida

Supreme Court and Death Penalty Appeals," 74 J. of Crim. Law &
Criminology 913 (1983)).
Of the 18 death penalty cases in which the California
Supreme Court has reversed the conviction of guilt, by far the
largest number of reversals, eight cases, were based on issues

II!

related to the role of defense counsel in capital cases.

In

three cases, the court concluded the defendant was deprived of
the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the federal and
state constitutions.

(people v. Frierson (1979) 25 C.3d 142;

People v. Mozingo, (1983) 34 C.3d 926; People v. Mroczko (1983)
35 C.3d 86).

All three decisions were unanimous.

In the first

two cases, the court found that the incompetency of retained
counsel deprived the defendants of the effective assistance of
counsel.

In the third case, a conflict of interest in joint

representation of twv defendants by the same contract public
defender necessitated reversal.

Another two cases resulted in

19

reversal due to deprivation of the defendant'a rights to self
representation under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.
In People v. Joseph (1983) .34 C.3d 938, the Court held the trial
cour~

erred by applying a higher standard of competency to waive

counsel in capital cases than in non-capital cases.

In People v.

Bigelow (1984) 37 C.3d 731, the Court held the trial court erred
in concluding that it lacked discretion to appoint advisory
counsel for a defendant who elected to represent himself.
of these holdings were also unanimous.

Both

still another unanimous

reversal was based on deprivation of the defendant's right to
counsel of his choice, when the trial court refused a continuance
·.~

/

to permit the defendant to select a replacement for an
experienced trial lawyer who withdrew as co-counsel on the eve of
trial.

People v. Gzikowski (1982) .32 C.3d 580.

The large number of reversals based on issues involving
competency of counsel may be one symptom of a serious deficiency
in the processing of Capital cases in California.

It has been

estimated that 15-20% of trial representation·and20% of
appellate representation in California death penalty cases is
"significantly substandard."

Millman, "Financing the Right to

Counsel in capital Cases," Proceedings of Conference on Financing
. the Right to Counsel in California, 19 Loy. (L.A.) L. Rev. 383,
385 (1985).

Less than 2% of death row inmates are represented by

retained counsel.

Id. at 384.

Providing adequate funding for

the defense of capital cases is not just an issue of fairness, it
is an issue of sound economics.

Reversals necessitated by

20

incompetence of counsel require expensive retrials that may be
avoidable.

TWo more convictions were reversed because the requirements
of California Penal Code

1018 were not observed.

§

(people v!

Chadd (1981) 28 C.3d 739; People v. Massie (1985) 40 C.3d 620) .
Section 1018 requires the consent of defense counsel to a plea of
guilty entered in a capital cases.
Chadd dissenters urged that

§

Both decisions were 5-2.

The

1018 be declared unconstitutional.

The Massie dissenters argued that the reluctant concurrence of
defense counsel in a plea entered before Chadd was decided was
sufficient to comply with

§

1018.

section 1018 may be inconsistent with the right of self
representation under Faretta.

If a defendant insists on entering

a guilty plea over counsel's objection, People v. Joseph gives
him the option of waiving counsel.

But

§

1018 now provides that

"No plea of guilty • . . shall be received from a defendant who
does not appear with counsel, nor shall any such plea be received
without the consent of the defendant's counsel."

Thus, the final

authority to permit a plea of guilty is relegated to counsel,
even in cases where the defendant is competent to waive counsel.
This creates an anomaly the legislature may wish to address.
The·second largest category of reversals of convictions of
guilt, seven cases, were based on the erroneous admission or
exclusion of evidence on the issue of guilt.

Half of these cases

involved the erroneous admission of out of court statements by
the defendant.

In people v. Hogan (1982) 31 C.3d 815, the
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defendant's statemento

wer~

found involuntary.

In Peoplo V.

Mattson (1984) 37 C.3d 85, the Court concluded the defendant's
statements were elicited in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.

And

in People v. Arcega (1982) 32 C.3d 504, the Court found that
statements made by the defendant

t~

a psychiatrist conducting a

competency examination were erroneously admitted in violation of
the defendant's constitutional privilege against selfincrimination.

Justice Mosk and Justice Richardson dissented in

Hogan and Arcega, while Justices Kaus and Grodin dissented from
Justice Mosk's majority opinion in Mattson.

The reversals in

Hogan and Arcega were required by U.S. Supreme Court precedents
interpreting the federal constitution.

Although Mattson relied

directly on California law to exclude evidence which the federal
constitution would not require be excluded, the result would not
be different if Proposition Eight, enacted in June, 1982, were
being applied.

The "truth.in evidence" provision does not apply

to exclusionary rules based on evidentiary privilege against
self-incrimination.
802.

Ramona R. v. Superior Court (1985) 37 C.3d

Proposition Eight has no application to crimes committed

before the date of its enactment.

People v. Smith (1983) 34 C.3d

251.
Another three convictions were overturned because of
erroneous admission of prior criminal conduct of the defendant.
In People v. Alcala (1984) 36 C.3d 604, the defendant's
convictions of three prior abductions of young girls were
erroneously admitted to show the defendant's identity as the
perpetrator of the charged abduction and murder.
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In People v.

H2lt (1984) 37 C.3d 436, one basiB for reversal waG that the
defendant'o prior convictions of burglary and prison escape were
erroneously admitted to impeach his testimony at trial.

Both

cases were decided 5-1, with Justice Mosk dissenting in both
cases.

In a third case, reversed f~r failure to consider

appointment of advisory counsel for a defendant who elected to
represent himself, the Court also concluded that evidence of
other crimes by the defendant was erroneously admitted.
v. Bigelow (1984) 37 C.3d 731.

People

It would appear that the

,I

enactment of proposition Eight in June of 1982 would change one
basis for the result in Holt, permitting use of all felonies
involving "moral turpitude" to impeach the defendant's testiJTIony.
See People v. Castro (1985) C.3d 301.
The remaining reversals of the underlying conviction of
guilt were based on a wide variety of grounds, including failure
to conduct a competency hearing (people v. Stankewitz (Douglas)
(1982) 32 C.3d 80), underrepresentation of 'minorities in the jury
pool (People v. Harris (1984) 36 C.3d 36), denial of pre-trial
discovery (people v. Memro (1985) 38 C.3d 658) and erroneous jury
instructions (people v. Cro~ (1985) 41 C.3d 1).
cases were decided by a closely divided court:

Most of these
Stankewitz and

Harris were 4-2, Memro was 4-3, and Croy was 5-2.

In addition to the eighteen reversals of the conviction of
guilt on automatic appeals, the court set aside one conviction in
a death penalty case 'on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
In th

e case

f In Re stankewitz (Laird) (1985) 40 C.3d 391
0

---

~

-

the
'
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court granted a new trial on the grounds of misconduct of n juror
during deliberations.

A review of the grounds for· the eighteen reversals of
convictions of guilt in capital cases reveals some ·interesting
patterns.

First, 44% of the reversals "lere necessitated by

errors relating to the assistance of counsel for the accused.
:
i,

':

I

These decisions are characterized by a remarkable rate of

I

unanimity among the Justices.

In Strickland v. Washington (1984)

466 U.S. 668 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the. standard of
competence required of counsel is no different for capital cases
than for any other criminal case.

The factual circumstances of

the cases which the California Supreme Court reversed for
deprivation of effective assistance of counsel would require
reversal of any criminal conviction.

It does.not appear that the

court is applying a higher standard of competency for capital
cases, although the greater complexity of such cases quite
naturally imposes greater demands on defense counsel's
performance.
Second, 39% of the reversals were based at least in part on
the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence at trial.

This

figure might be compared to an analysis of the grounds for all
reversals of appeals decided by the Courts. of Appeal.

At the

behest· of the Legislative Analyst, the Judicial Council examined
the grounds. for all appeals resulting in reversals for a two
month period in 1981.

Of the 75 criminal cases included, the

erroneous denial of suppression motions accounted for 9
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(1983 Annual Report,

reversalo , or 12t of the total.
Council of Califorriia, p .. 7).

It should also be noted that

Proposition Eight would probably require affirmance of only one
of the 7 cases reversed on evidentiary grounds if it applied.
Finally, only one reversal of the conviction of guilt was
based on erroneous instructions to the jury.

This is not

surprising, since the pattern jury instructions routinely
utilized in criminal cases are rarely reversed.

By contrast ,
I

however, all of the reversals of the finding of special

I

circumstances and most of the penalty reversals under the 1978
Briggs Initiative have been due to errors in the instructions to
the jury.

unquestionably, this is attributable to the

~nset~ling

influence of the many changes wrought by the Briggs Initiative
and the lack of authoritative opinions interpreting those
changes.

In this respect, there is a strong parallel to the

results reported in the 1983 Annual Report of the Judicial
Council, referred to above.

I

'~

That study revealed 41 reversals, or

55% of the 75 criminal cases included, were due to sentencing
errors.

A significant increase in such reversals was attributed
, i

to the enactment of the determinate sentencing act in 1978.

The

report concluded:
"As to criminal appeals, therefore, there,is some
'd
th t both increased appeals and 1ncreased
eV1 ence
a, c~de with the adoption of a new and
error may co~n ...
complex law."
Id
That phenomenon appears to be repeating itself in
~., atp. 9.
the outcorr.e of the Supreme court review of the finding of special
circumstances and determination of penalty under the 1978 Briggs
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Initiative, addreosed in the romaining sections ot thio paper.

IV.

The Finding of special Circumstances.
Under both the 1977 law and the 1978 Briggs Initiative, a

sentence of death or life without parole can be imposed for first
degree murder only if the fact finder concludes that one or more
of the "special circumstances" specified in Penal Code section
190.2 is true.

Recognizing that not all first degree murders

merit the ultimate penalty of death, ,the "special circumstances"
contribute to the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate of
the U.s. Supreme Court that discretion be directed and limited to
provide a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which
it is not."

Furman v. Georgia, (1972) 408 U.s. 238, 313; Gregg

v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 189.

The "special circumstance"

must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

with a single

exception (a prior conviction of murder), the fact finder decides
the truth of the "special circumstance" at the same time that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the defendant on the
underlying murder charge.

If a verdict of guilty is returned

with a finding that one or more

"sp~cial

circumstances" are true,

the jury (or judge, if jury is waived) then proceeds in a
separate hearing to decide whether a punisl:lment of death or.life
without parole should be imposed.
When a death penalty judgment is reviewed on automatic
appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court ordinarily has no occasion
to review the finding of "special circumstances" if the
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underlying conviction itself is reversed.

The caso is remanded

for a new trial, at which both guilt of the underlying charge and
the truth of "special circumstances" will again be determined.
If the underlying conviction is affirmed, however, the Court must
still review the finding of "special circumstances."

If the

finding of "special circumstances" is reversed, the case is
usually remanded for a new trial limited to the issue of the
truth of the "special circumstances."

A remand may be precluded

by the constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy, however, if
the finding of "special circumstances" is reversed due to
insufficiency of the evidence.
Of the 54 death penalty judgments reviewed on automatic
appeal to the California Supreme Court since 1977, the Court has
affirmed the conviction and proceeded to review the findings of
"special circumstances" in 36 cases.

(In one case reviewed under

the 1978 Briggs Initiative, the court reviewed and reversed the
finding of "special circumstances" after reversing the underlying
conviction.

people v. Bigelow (1984) 37 C.3d 731).

Of those 36

cases, 19 (53%) have resulted in a reversal of the finding of
"special circumstances."

All but four of these reversals,

however, were in cases tried under the 1978 Briggs Initiative.
While the "special circumstances" provisions of the 1977 law
emerged virtually unscathed from the process of jUdicial review,
75% of the cases tried under the Briggs Initiative in which
convictions were affirmed were reversed due to error in the
finding of special circumstances.

Most of these reversals were

due to the same error: failure to instruct the jury of the need
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~o

find intent to kill where "felony-murder" special

circumstances were

A.

utilized~

The 1977 Law

The 1977 Law specified a total of eleven possible "special
circumstances" which might be alleged to justify imposition of a
sentence of death or life without parole for first degree murder.
The death penalty "las imposed in a total of twenty-seven of the
cases reviewed thus far under the 1977 law.

In most of these

cases, more than one "special circumstance" was found.

Eighteen

of the cases included findings that the murder was committed
.~.

during the commission of another felony: Robbery (sixteen

ca~es)

;

Kidnapping (six cases); Rape (three cases); Burglary (four
cases); and Lewd Act Upon a Child (one case).

Thirteen cases

included findings that the defendant was convicted of more than
one murder.

One case included a finding the murder involved

infliction of torture, one included a finding that the murder was
done for valuable consideration, one included a finding that the
victim was a police officer in the line of duty, and four
included a finding that the defendant had a prior murder
conviction.
In reviewing these twenty-seven cases on automatic appeal,
the California Supreme Court reversed the conviction of guilt in
eleven cases.

Out of the sixteen cases in which the conviction

was affirmed the Court upheld the finding of "special
circumstances" in all but four cases.

The Court actually upheld

findings of "special circumstances" involvi:ng eight of the eleven
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categories listed under the 1977 law:
(1)

Murder for valuable consideration
(Easley)

(2)

Murder during commission of robbery
(Velasquez, Lanphear, Harris, Robertson, Fields,
Phillips)

(3)

Murder during commisssion of kidnapping
(Robertson, Frank)

(4)

Murder during commission of rape
(Robertson)

(5)

Murder during commission of burglary
(Jackson, Harris)

(6)

Murder involving infliction of torture
(Robertson)

(7)

conviction of more than one murder
(Jackson, Harris, Murtishaw, Haskett, Robertson,
Easley)

(8)

Murder after a prior conviction of murder
(Velasquez, Lanphear)

Two of the four cases in which findings of "special
circumstances" were reversed under the 1977 law involved
procedural errors which were unrelated to the legal definition of
special circumstances.

In Peoplev. Teron (1979) 23 Ca1.3d 103,

the Court simply held the 1977 death penalty law could not be
retroactively applied to a murder committed prior to its
enactment.

While the underlying conviction of murder was

affirmed, the finding of "special circumstances" was reversed.

29

In People y. FriGt"r+Qo (1985) 39 cal .. 3d a03, the Court reversed
the finding of special circumstances because of defense counsel's
refusal to present evidence that the defendant wanted to present.
The same case had previously bean reversed on the conviction of
guilt due to incompetence of counsel.
The other two cases in which findings of "special
circumstances" were reversed under the 1977 law involved
allegations that the murders were committed "during the
commission" of, in one case a robbery and kidnapping, (People v.
Green (1980) 27 C.3d 1) and in the other, a rObbery and burglary,
(People v. Thompson (1980) 27 C.3d 303).

In both cases, the

Court found the felonie's in question were incidental to the
murder, rather than vice-versa.

As the Court construed the

requirement that the murder occur "during the commission" of an
enumerated felony,
"at the very least, therefore, the Legislature must
have intended that each special circumstan~e provide a
rational basis for distinguishing between those
murderers who deserve to be considered for the death
penalty and those who do not. The Legislature declared
that such a distinction could be drawn, inter alia,
when the defendant committed a 'willful, deliberate and
premeditated' murder 'during the commission' of a
robbery or other listed felony • • • The provision thus
expressed a legislative belief that it was not
unconstitutionally arbitrary to expose to the death
penalty those ,defendants who killed in cold blood in
order to advance an independent felonious purpose,
e.g., who carried out an execution-style slaying of the
victim of or witness to a holdup, a kidnapping, or a
rape. The Legislature's goal is not achieved, however,
when the defendant's intent is not to steal but to kill
and the robbery is merely incidental to the murder--'a
second thing to it,' as the jury foreman here said-because its sole obj ec·t is to facilitate or conceal the
primary crime."
(Green, 27 Cal.3d at p. 61).

Neither of· these cases found any
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error in tho instructions to the jury.

Rather, based on an

insufficiency of the evidence, they concluded that the "special
circumstances" alleged had not been proven.

In numerous

subsequent cases under the 1977 law, the Court has distinguished
its holdings in Green and Thompson, upholding findings of .
"special circumstances" which included a murder "during the
commission" of robbery, kidnapping, rape and burglary.
Thus, in stark contrast to the 1978 Briggs Initiative, the
1977 death penalty law was remarkably successful in defining
"special circumstances" which survived judicial scrutiny.

The

findings of "special circumstances" were sustained in 75% of the
cases in which they were reviewed, and the Court was unanimocs in
most of those holdings.

By contrast, in cases arising under the

1978 Briggs Initiative, the finding of "special circumstances"
was struck down in 75% of the cases in which that finding was
reviewed after affirmance of the conviction of guilt.
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·S;

The 1978 Briggs
·~he

Initiatiye~

1978 death penalty law, adopted by initiative in

'Nove~e~, 1978, substantially expa.nded the "special
circuin~tancesn

without parole.
1.

availab+e to permit a· sentence of death or life
The new categories created included:

Murder committed to prevent arrest or perfect an· escape
from la't>lful custody;

2.

Murder of federal law enforcement officers, firemen,
pros~cutors,

judges or elected officials related to the

performance of their duties;
3.

Murder which was "especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel;"

4.

Murder committed by lying in wait;

5.

Murder committed because of the victim's race, color,
religion or nationality;

6.

Murder committed by poison.

The initiative measure also made significant modifications in the
categories of "special circumstances el previously defined in the
1977 law.

Most significant were the changes in the "felony-

murder" categories.

Under the 1977 law, it. was absolutely clear

that an intent to kill on the part of the defendant was prerequisite to a finding that the murder was committed during the
commission of an enumerated felony'.

section 190.2(c) had

required that:
"The defendant was personally present during the
commission of the act or acts causing death, and with
intent to cause death physically aided or committed
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such act or acts causing death .•. "
Section 190.2(d) had further provided:
"For the purposes of subdivision (c), the defendant
shall be deemed to have physically aided in the act or
acts causing death only if it is proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that his conduct constitutes an
assault or a battery upon the victim or if by word or
conduct he orders, initiates or coerces the actual
killing of the victim."
Both of these provisions were eliminated by the Briggs
Initiative, but what was substituted left somewhat ambiguous the
question whether a defendant participating in a felony had to
actually intend to cause the death of the victim.

Section

190.2(a) (17) now requires that:
"The murder was committed while the defendant was
engaged in or was an accomplice in the commission of
attempted commission, ,or the immediate flight after I
committing or attempt~ng to commit [an enumerated
felony] ."
Section 190.2(b), however, imposes a broad requirement of intent
on all "special circumstances" with the exception of that for
prior conviction of murder:
"Every person wh ther or no~ the actuc:l killer found
7
guilty of intent~~nallY
a~d~n~, abett~ng, ,counseling,
commanding, induc~ng~ sol~c~t~n~, ~equest~ng, or
assisting any actor ~n the comm~ss~on of murder in the
first degree shall suf~er d~ath or confine~ent in state
prison for a term of l~fe,w~thout the poss~bility of
parole, in any case in wh~ch one or more of the special
circumstances enumerated ~n paragraph .•. (17) ... of
subdivision (a) of this se~tion has been charged and
specially found under Sect~on 190.4 to be true."
The issc~ of intent raised by this ambiguity achieved
constitutional stature in Enmund v. Florida (·1982) 458 U.S. 782 ,
in which the U.S. supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment
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prohibition of crucl and unusual punichmont procludoo tho
imposition of a death ponalty in thQ abaonco 'of proof that the
defendant killed, attempted
that life would be taken.

~o

kill, or intended or contemplated

Interestingly, the u.s. Supreme Court

noted that "only e.ightjurisdictions authorize imposition of the
death penalty solely for participation in a robbery in which
another robber takes life.'"

Aside from Florida, the

jurisdictions identified included California, Georgia,
Mississippi, Nevada, South Carolina, Tennessee and Wyoming.
Many of these states responded to Enmund by incorporating a
requirement that the jury be instructed to make a factual finding
of intent to kill before a ,death penalty can be imposed.

In

Allen v. State (1984) 321 S.E.2d 710, 715 n. 3, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that where the death penalty is sought in a
felony-murder case, the jury must be given the option of three
verdicts:
not guilty.

guilty of malice murder, guilty of felony murder or
The Mississippi legislature amended that state's

death penalty law to require Enmund findings.
99-19-101(7) (Supp. 1985).

Miss.Code Ann.

§

The South Carolina Supreme Court held

that during the penalty phase of a capital case,
"the trial judge should charge that the death penalty
can not be imposed on an individual who aids arid abets
in a a crime in the course of which a murder is
committed by others, but who di~ not himself kill,
attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or
that lethal force be used."
State v. Peterson (1985) 335 S.E.2d 800.

Recently, the u.S.

Supreme Court held in a 5-4 ruling, that the Enmund findings can
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be made by an appellate court, a trial judge or a jury, and
special instructions for a factual determination by the jury are

Cabana v. Bullock (1986)

not constitutionally required.

______ u.s.

,

38 Cr. L. 3093.

The California Supreme Court addressed this problem for the
first time in Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 C.3d 131.
Carlos was not a review of a death penalty judgment, but a
pretrial writ challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
presented at a preliminary hearing.

Significantly, the issue was

resolved as a question of statutory construction, rather than a
constitutional question.

The Court resolved the ambiguity by

construing Section 190.2(b) to require a finding of intent tc
kill before a defendant is subject to a felony murder special
circumstance finding under Section 190.2(a) (17).

Strong support

for this interpretation was found in the ballot arguments which
accompanied the Briggs Initiative.

Voters were given emphatic

assurances that one who merely aids another in committing a
murder without intent to kill was not subject to the death
penalty because section 190.2(b) "says that the person must have
INTENTIONALLY aided in the commission of a murder to be subject
to the death penalty under this initiative."
Eight months later, in Peoplev. Garcia (1984) 36 C.3d 539,
the Court declared that Carlos would apply retroactively to all
cases not yet final, and that, with limited exceptions to be
noted, Carlos error is reversible per se, with no additional
showing of prejudice required.

The per se rule was found to be

constitutionally required, because a failure to instruct the jury
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that intent to kill muctbo found deprivao tho dcf0ndant of his
constitutional right that"u jury be convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt.

The impact of tho U.S. Supreme Court's recent ruling in

Cabana v. Bullock upon the

~

holding is yet to be

determined, but it does not appear to erode the constitutional
underpinnings of Garcia.

Cabana held that "the Eighth Amendment

simply imposes a requirement that the Enmund findings be made
before a defendant can be executed.

The findings need not be

made in the same manner as underlying elements" of the crime, so a
post hoc determination of an appellate court is adequate.
Garcia, however, was based on the fact that Carlos had
interpreted the statutory" requirements for a finding of special
circumstances in felony murder cases to include a finding of
intent to kill, thus creating a state-law entitlement to jury
findings.

The critical significance of the difference was noted

by Justice White in his majority opinion in Cabana v. Bullock, 38
Cr.L. at 3096, n.4, responding to Justice Blackmun's dissenting
reliance on Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343:
In Hicks, we held only that where state law creates for
the defendant a liberty interest in having the jury
make particular findings, the Due Process Clause
implies that appellate findings do not suffice to
protect that entitlement. Unlike the defendant in
Hicks, Bullock had no state-law entitlement at the time
of his trial to have the jury (or indeed, anyone at
all) make the Enmund findings. Of course, federal law
as later established by Enmund, does entitle Bullock to
a determination whether he killed, attempted to kill,
intended to kill or intended that lethal force be used;
but for the reasons explained in the text, the federallaw entitlement, unlike the state-law entitlement
involved in Hicks, does not specify who must make the
findings.
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The Carlos/Garcia rulings havQ had groator impact on doath
penalty adjudication in California than any other decisions of
the California Supreme Court.

Of the 20 cases in which the

conviction of guilt was upheld and the finding of· special
circumstances reviewed, 15 (75%) have resulted in reversal of the
finding of special circumstances, and every one of these
reversals has been based at least in part on the Carlos/Garcia
rulings.
The felony-murder special circumstances are frequently
utilized in death penalty cases under the Briggs Initiative.

Of

the 27 cases tried under the Briggs Initiative which have been
reviewed thus far, all but two included an allegation of at least
one felony-murder "special circumstance":

21 murder during

commission of a robbery; 3 murder during commission of a
kidnapping; 3 murder during commission of a burglary; and 2
murder duri.ng commission of a rape.

The two cases in which

felony-murder special circumstances were not alleged both
resulted in affirmance of the finding of special circumstances.
In

People v. Deere (l985) 41 C.3d 353, findings of the special

circumstance of multiple murder were affirmed, and in People v.
Davenport (1985) 41 C.3d 247, a finding of the special
circumstance of torture-murder was affirmed.
only three cases in which felony-murder special
circumstances were alleged under the 1978 Briggs Initiative
resultec in affirmance of the finding of special circumstances.
All came within exceptions to the Carlos/Garcia rulings.
In People v. Brown (1985) 40 C.3d 512, the jury made a
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special finding that tho: DlurdGr waa premeditated, thuD precluding
any attack on tho finding of a rape-murder "special circumstance"
under CarlQs/Gsafc:l!!.

In P09ple v. tLQntiel (1985) 39 C.3d 910,

the jury mado a finding the murder waG intentional in the course
of finding another special circumstance was true:

that the

murder "was intentional and carried out for financial gain."
Even though the financial gain "special circumstance" was set
aside, the court held the intent finding could be utilized to
sustain the felony-murder "special circumstance."

In People v.

Walker (1985) 41 C.3d 116, the Court found two exceptions to
Carlos/Garcia applicable.' First, the issue of intent was
necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant other under
instructions.

The defendant was charged with assault with intent

to kill.two other victims

sh~t

at the same time as the murder

victim, and the court found it '''inconceivable that a jury would
find that a defendant intended to kill only the victims who
survived, .and not the one who died."

Second, an exception

applies "",here the parties recognized that intent to kill was in
issue, presented all evidence at their command on that issue, and
. . • the record not only establishes the necessary intent as a
matter of law but shows the contrary evidence not worthy of
consideration."

The court assumed that all evidence available on

intent was presented because it was an explicit element in issue,
but suggested that the defendant could pursue a writ of habeas
corpus if he "can demonstrate that this assumption is
inaccurate."
The Attorney General has predicted that Carlos/Garcia will
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require reversal of the finding of special circumstances in
dozens more of the still pending cases.

Walker offers little

prospect of altering the accuracy of that prediction.

As the

court noted in Walker.
"We emphasize that Carlos error is ordinarily
reversible per se, and that the tack we take here affirming the finding of special circumstances subject
to possible review on petition for habeas corpus arises from the particular facts before us in this
case."

41 Cal.3d at 138, n. 6.
While most reversals of "special circumstances" findings
pursuant to the Carlos/Garcia rule have been in cases where
felony-murder "special circumstances" were alleged pursuant to
Section 190.2(a) (17), the Carlos/Garcia rule raises troublesome
issues with respect to other definitions of "special
circumstances" as well.
First, the "intent" requirement of section 190.2(b)
specifically includes all of the 19 enumerated "special
circumstances" definitions except (a) (2), prior conviction of
murder.

This creates an anomaly, because some of the enumerated

definitions include a specific requirement of intent, while
others do not.
(a)

(3)

I

The multiple-murder special circumstance of

for example, simply requires that the defendant "has in

this proceeding been convicted of more than one offense of murder
in the first or second degree."

In People v. Turner (1984) 37

C.3d 302, the Supreme Cou:t.'t reversed a "special circumstance"
finding of multiple murder as well as two felony-murder "special
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circumctanc~n

findinqB p holding that CarlQm intorprotod Scction

190.2(b) to apply to tho actual killor

&0

well

GO

to an

accomplic0, and by ita terms it applies to ths multiplo-murder
"special circumstance" as t<lell as the felony-murder "special
circumstance".

Thus, the intent instruction roquired by Carlos

must be given under all of the "special circumstances" enumerated
in section 190.2(a) except .(a) (2).
Second, even section 190.2(a) (2) may raise a problem if it
is applied to an accomplice who is not the actual killer and has
no intent to kill.

Since

190~2(b)

el,cludes (a) (2) from its

enumeration, the· ruling in Carlos has no direct application.
While the Supreme Court has not yet addressed this problem, one
division of the Second District· Court of Appeal, in a non-death
penalty case, held that (a) (2) does not require an intent to
kill, but is. limited to the actual killer and does not apply to
accomplices at all.

The Court reasoned:

"If subdivision (b) 't'/ere made applicable to subdivision
(a) (2) then a person previously convicted of murder
would be subject to the death penalty or life without
possibility of parole for aiding and abetting when the
actual killer might not be subject to that punishment •
.It is our opinion that in order to avoid that result
SUbdivision (a) (2) was designed as a special
circumstance to apply only to the actual killer. It is
our further opinion that subdivision (b) cannot be
interpreted as engrafting on subdivimion (a) (2) a
requirement of intent to kill or as limiting in any way
that type of first degree murder required for its
application."
People v. Rivera (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 1984.

Another division

of the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that section
(a) (2) can be applied to accomplices, but a requirement of intnet
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must be "road in" despito section (b) in ordor to comply with
Carlos.

People V, Malone (1985) 165 Cal. App. 3d 31.

The

California Supreme Court granted a hearing in the Rivera case on
September 12, 1985, to resolve this dispute, and the case is
currently pending before the Supreme Court.
Apart from the ambiguity as to Clintent to kill," many other
definitions of "special circumstances" under the 1978 Briggs
Initiative have created additional problems of interpretation for
the courts.
The inclusion of arson in the felony-murder "special
circumstance" of Section 190.2(a) (17) (viii) has created confusion
because it specifies "Arson in violation of section 447."

Tile

drafters apparently never looked up section 447 of the Penal
Code.

If they had, they would have discovered it was repealed in

1929.

In People v. Oliver (1985) 168 Cal. App. 3d 920, the

Second District Court of Appeal upheld a conviction and sentence
of life without parole based on the arson "special circumstance,"
since the defendant was concurrently convicted of a violation of
Penal Code

§

451, which restates the elements of arson in the

same language as prior

§

447.

The Court cautioned, however,

"In rejecting these claims on the facts before us, we
do not imply they would under all circumstances be
unmeritorious."
Id. at 926.

Additional confusion was created by the reference to

kidnapping in Section 190.2(a) (17) (ii), because it specifies
"Kidnapping in violation .of Sections 207 and 209."

41

The 1977

death penalty law includod'HKidnapping in violation of Section
207

Qk

209."

Penal Code Section 207 defineo simple kidnapping,

while Section 209 defines aggravated kidnapping.

In People v.

Bigelow (1984) 37 C.3d 731, the Court declared that the use of
the word "and" instead of "or" was a careless drafting error, and
upheld an instruction that permitted a special circumstance
finding if the defendant was convicted of kidnapping under either
section 207 or 209.
The "special circumstance" defined in Section 190.2(a) (14),
that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,
manifesting exceptional depravity," was declared
unconstitutionally vague by a 5-1 vote of the California Supreme
Court in People v. Superior Court (Engert) (1982) 31 Cal.3d 797.
Engert was clearly premised on state constitutional grounds, as
well as federal grounds.
met with mixed success.

Similar provisions in other states have
The Supreme Courts of Florida, Georgia,

Mississippi, Idaho and Wyoming have rejected the reasoning of
Engert, while that of Delaware has agreed.

The states which have

accepted a similarly worded "special circumstance" have been
plagued with many reversals of "special circumstance" findings
where this special circumstance is utilized, however.

In,

Florida, for example, no fewer than 25 cases have reversed a
finding that a murder was "heinous, atrocious or cruel" or "cold
and calculated" because of inSUfficiency of

evi~ence.

In striking down the "special circumstance" for "especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel" murders in Engert, the Court noted
the possible overlap with the "special circumstance" defined in
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Section

"" th e infliction
n 190.2(a} (lS), where tho murder "involv""d

of torture," further defined as tithe infliction of extreme pain
tI
no matter how long its duration.

In people

v.

Davenport (1985)

finding of "special
41 C.3d 247, the court affirmed a
allegation under the 1978
circumstances" based on a torture
Briggs Initiative.

The 1977 death penalty law also included a

torture "special circumstance," which explicitly required an
intent to inflict extreme and prolonged pain.

The Briggs

Initiative omitted any reference to intent, focusing on the
victim's experience of pain.

The Court in Davenport found this

focus ambiguous, because the victim's experience would be
difficult to prove, and to distinguish murders on such a bas~s
would raise a significant constitutional issue of equal
protection of the law.

Thus, it incorporated prior judicial

construction of the term "torture" to require an intent to
torture the victim.

since the trial court had instructed the

jury that both an intent to kill and the intentional infliction
of extreme physical pain must be proven to establish the torture
"special circumstance," the finding was upheld by the Court.
Two more "special circumstance" definitions under the 1978
Briggs Initiative were construed in people v. Bigelow (1984) 37
C.3d 731.

First, a finding that the murder was carried out for

financial gain was reversed because the trial court construed it
too broadly.

Noting that the special circumstance defined in

Section 1.90.2 (a) (1) "replaced the precise language of the 1977
act with vague and broad generalities," the Court adopted a
limiting construction requiring that the victim's death be an
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essential pre-requicito to
defendant.

financial gain cought by the

th~

A similar interpretation

of

analogous language has

been adopted by the courts of Alabama, Florida and Nebraska, but
rejected by Mississippi and North Carolina.

Second, a finding

that the murder was committed tlfor the purpose of avoiding or
preventing a lawful arrest or to perfect, or attempt to perfect
an escape from lawful custody,"

\>las

also reversed because of the

broad interpretation given by the trial court.

The Court held

that the special circumstance of avoiding arrest must be limited
to cases in which arrest is imminent, and the special
circumstance of perfecting escape must be limited to situations
before the defendant has departed the confines of a prison
facili ty and reached a place of·. temporary safety outside the
confines of the prison.

In construing both the financial gain

and avoiding arrest/perfecting escape "special circumstances,"
the Court was concerned with the SUbstantial overlap with felonymurder "special circumstances"

which would result if these

provisions were broadly construed:
"we believe the court should construe special
circumstance provisions to minimize those cases in
which multiple circumstances will apply to the same
conduct, thereby reducing the risk that multiple
findings on special circumstances will prejudice the
defendant ...
Id. at 751.
The final "special circumstance" which created a problem of
construction under the Briggs Initiative was section
190.2(a) (10), where the murder was committed to prevent the
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victim from testifying in a criminal proceeding.

In People y.

Weidert (1985) 39 C.3d 836, the Court held this provision could
not be applied to a defendant who killed the victim to prevent
his testimony in a juvenile delinquency proceeding.

The Court

relied upon the long-standing distinction between criminal and
juvenile proceedings embodied in Welfare and Institutions Code

§

203:

"An order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the
juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction for any
purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court
be deemed a criminal proceeding."
Apparently, the drafters of the initiative were oblivious to the
impact of this crucial

~rovision.

To summarize the implementation of the "special
circumstances" provisions of the 1978 Briggs Initiative, nearly
every clause has created a serious problem of construction,
either because the element of intent was not carefully defined,
or because careless drafting errors created inconsistencies or
ambiguities.

As a result, the finding of special circumstances

has been struck down in 75% of the cases in which it was reviewed
after affirmance of the conviction of guilt.

This is in sharp

contrast to the 1977 law, under which 75% of such findings
reviewed were upheld.
for this dismal record.

The Supreme Court can hardly be faulted
In case after case, the Court has

strained to give the "special circumstance" provisions a
reasonable construction, to avoid declaring them
unconstitutional.

While this has necessitated numerous reversals
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in cases where trial judgos could not anticipato how these
provisions would be construed, the Court has now provided
authpritative interpretations of nearly all of the "special
circumstance" provisions that.are most frequently utilized.
Thus, it can be anticipated that the affirmance rate for cases
being tried today will increase substantially.

Ironically, every

case prosecuted under the Briggs Initiative reviewed so far could
have been prosecuted as a capital case under the 1977 law.
Unquestionably, the rate of affirmance of the findings of special
circumstances would have been substantially higher.

Thus, the

Briggs Initiative added little to the law except confusion, and
the price being paid for that addition is numerous reversals that
would have been unnecessary if the 1977 law had remained
unchanged.
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V.

The Determination of Penalty
Under both the 1977 death penalty law and the 1978 Briggs

Initiative , after a defendant has been convicted and an
allegation of "special circumstances" found true, a separate
hearing for the determination of penalty is mandated.

That

hearing ordinarily takes place before the same jury which
convicted the defendant and found the "special circumstances" to
be true.

Even if the defendant waived a jury trial on the issue

of guilt or special circumstances, or pled guilty, he is entitled
to a jury determination of the penalty.

The jury must choose

between the penalties of death or life imprisonment without
pOssibility of parole, and must agree unanimously as to that
choice.

Evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is

admitted, and the jury is instructed as to the exercise of their
discretion.

In reviewing the determination of penalty, the

California supreme court may be called upon to decide a variety
of issues, including the procedure by which the jury was
selected, the admissibility of evidence, the competence of
counsel, and the propriety of instructions to the jury.

Since

the restoration of the death penalty in California on August 11,
1977, the Supreme Court has reviewed the penalty determination in
seventeen cases in which a conviction of guilt and finding of
special circumstances were affirmed.

(In one additional case,

People v. Ramos (1982 30 C.3d 353, the Court reviewed the
determination of penalty even though the finding of special
circumstances was reversed).

Of these seventeen cases, the
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determination of penalty was .rcversed in fourteen.

All three of

the affirmances were in cases under the 1977 death penalty law.
Thus far, the determination of penalty under the 1978 Briggs
Initiative has been reversed in every case in which it was
reviewed.
A.

The 1977 Law.
The determination of penalty has been

revie~.,ed

twelve cases under the 1977 death penalty law.

In three cases,

the imposition of the death penalty was affirmed.
Jackson

(1~80)

in a total of

People v.

28 C.3d 264; People v. Harris. (1981) 28 C.3d 935;

People v. Fields (1983) 35 C.3d 329.

All three cases were

affirmed by a closely divided Court (4-3 in Jackson, 4-2 in
Harris and Fields), and all thiee cases are still pending in the
courts.
/

Harris is seeking a writ of habeas corpus in the federal

courts, while Jackson and Fields have petitions for writs pending
in California courts.
Of the nine cases in which the determination of penalty was
reversed, five were for procedural 'errors and four were because
of instructions given to the jury.
The

pro~edural

"Witherspoon" error.

errors included two cases reversed for
People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 C.3d 425;

People v. Lanphear (1980) 26 C.3d 814.

In Witherspoon v •
•

Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, the U.S. Supreme Court established
standards for the exclusion of jurors who have conscientious
scruples regarding imposition of the death penalty.

While such

scruples were expressed by jurors in both Velasquez and Lanphear,
the jurors never indicated they would automatically vote against
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the death penalty under all circUMstances.

Ralying upon specific

language in footnote 21 of Witherspoon, the California Supreme
Court held it was error to excuse the jurors in both cases.
Footnote 21 declared that jurors could be excluded if they "made
unmistakably clear ••• that they would automatically vote against
the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any
evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before
them •••• "

The

u.s.

Supreme Court again addressed the standard

for exclusion of jurors with death penalty scruples in Adams v.
Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, holding that a juror could be excluded
if his views about capital punishment "would prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in
accordance with his instructions and his oath."

On petitions for

certiorari, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated both Velasquez and
Lanphear, and remanded them for "further consideration in light
of Adams v. Texas."

On remand, the California Supreme Court

again reversed, relying squarely on footnote 21 of Witherspoon,
declaring that Adams v. Texas "does not alter this conclusion."
People v. Velasquez (1980) 28 C.3d 461; People v. Lanphear (1980)
28 C.3d 463.

In 1985, the U.S. Supreme Court finally clarified

the confusion between the Witherspoon and Adams standards by
explicitly rejecting footnote 21 of Witherspoon as dicta.

In

Wainwright v. witt (1985) ____U.S. ___ , 36 Cr.L. 3116, the Court
concluded:
"We therefore take this opportunity to clarify our
decision in witherspoon, and to reaffirm the abovequoted standard from Adams as the proper standard •... We
note that, in addition to dispensing with
Witherspoon's reference to 'automatic' decision making,
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thia standard liktawioo does not requiro that a juror's
biao be proved with unmistnkable clarity."

rg. at 3119.

It appears unlikely that the new atandard approved

in Wainwright v.

~

would require reversal of cases like

Velasquez or Lanphear if they were to recur today.

That is not

to suggest that Velasquez·or Lanphear were wrongly decided,
however.

As Justice Rehnquist conceded in his majority opinion

in wainwright v. witt, the confused state of the case law lef.t
trial courts a difficult tasle, "obviously made more difficult by
the fact that the standard applied in Adams differs markedly from
the language of footnote 21 •.•. given witherspoon's facts a court
applying the general principles of Adams could have arrived at
the 'automatically' language of Witherspoon's footnote 21."

Id.

Another three reversals of penalty determinations were based
on the erroneous admission of prejudicial evidence.

In People v.

Murtishaw (1981) 29 C.3d 733, the evidence was a prediction by a
psychopharmacologist who briefly examined the defendant that he
would continue to be violent in a prison setting.

The Court

found such predictions too unreliable to be admissible as
evidence in a death penalty determination.

The admission of

similar predictions was held not to violate the due process
clause of the federal constitution by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Barefoot v. Estelle (1983) 463 U.S. 880.

It might be suggested

that enactment of proposition Eight in June of 1982 would require
california courts to now follow Barefoot v. Estelle and admit
such evidence.

Such a course would be dangerous.

Murtishaw is

premised on the conclusion that the prejudicial impact of the
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evidence outweighed its probative value.

Such determinations

pursuant to Evidence Code I 352 are unaffected by Proposition
Eight.

In People v. Frank

(1985) 38 C.3d 711, the erroneously

admitted evidence was notebooks which were illegally seized from
the defendant.

Although the Court concluded their admission was

harmless error in the guilt phase, their "dramatically greater"
role in the penalty phase required reversal of the penalty
determination.
Court held it

And in People v. Phillips (l985) 41 C.3d 29, the
~.,as

error to admit evidence of defendant's

discussion with another of proposed criminal activity, since
evidence of other "criminal activity" in the penalty phase must
relate to actual, completed crime.
The Phillips Court also found error in the penalty phase
instructions, in failing to instruct the jury that evidence of
other crimes relied upon as an aggravating circumstance must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

In this respect, the Court

followed its prior ruling in People v. Robertson (1982) 33 C.3d
21, which held that this long-standing California rule had not
been overruled sub silentio by the 1977 death penalty law.
Another reversal for erroneous jury instructions came in
People v. Haskett (1982) 30 C.3d 841, where the trial judge
instructed the jury that the Governor could commute a sentence of
life without possibility of parole.

Such an instruction was

mandated by the 1978 Briggs Initiative, and will be discussed in
greater detail in the treatment of cases decided under the 1978
Initiative.

Since Haskett arose under the 1977 law, however, the

instruction was not mandated in that case.
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In holding that it

was error to

giv~

the instruction, the Court placed principal.

reliance on its precedent in People v. MQrse (1964) 60 C.2d 631.
~/O

more reversals of penalty determinations under the 1977

law were attributable to errors in instructions to the jury.

One

of the standard "boiler place" instructions routinely given in
criminal cases is CAIJIC No. 1.00:
"As jurors, you must not be influenced by pity for a
defendant or by prejudice against him. You must not be
swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy,
passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling."
In People v. Easley (1983) 34 C.3d 858, the Court held that it
was error to give this instruction at the penalty phase of a
capital case, even though it might be appropriate at the guilt
phase.

Actually, Easl3Y followed an earlier precedent of the

Court dating back to 1970.
609.

People v. Bandhauer (1970) 1 C.3d

The Court concluded the instruction could have the effect

of telling the jury not to give weight to mitigating evidence
presented by the defendant.

Easley was followed to require

another reversal of the penalty determination in People v.
Lanphear (1984) 36 C.3d 163, previously reversed because of
Witherspoon error.

The courts of other states have generally

rejected the Easley ruling, permitting "no sympathy"
instructions.

The Supreme Courts of Louisiana, Nevada, Oklahoma

and South Carolina have upheld such instructions, While the
Georgia Supreme Court has agreed with Easley.
ThUS, none of the nine reversals of penalty determinations
under the 1977 death penalty
drafting of the legislation.

la~l

were due to flaws in the

At least six of the reversals can
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be diractly traced to clGar precedents docided long before the
1977 law was enacted.

While at least one of those precedents

(Witherspoon) has since been repudiated by the

u.s.

Supreme

Court, only the U.S. supreme Court is in a position to repudiate
its own precedents.

Until they are repudiated, the California

Supreme Court is required to follow them.

B.

The 1978 Briggs Initiative
The California supreme Court has reviewed the penalty

determination in five cases tried under the 1978 Briggs
Initiative after affirming the conviction of guilt and finding of
special circumstances.

Four of the five reversals were for

instructional errors, and three of those four were instructional
errors directly attributable to the language of the initiative.
The 1978 Briggs Initiative made two fundamental changes in
the penalty determination procedure mandated by the 1977 death
penalty law.

The first change was to require an instruction be

given to the jury that a sentence of life without possibility of
parole can be commuted or modified:
"The trier fact shall b 7 instructed that a ~entence of
confinement to state pr~son fo~ a term of l~fe without
the possibility of parole may 7n.future after sentence
is imposed be commuted or mod~f~ed to a sentence that
includes the possibility of parole by the Governor of
the state of california."
Penal Code §190. 3 •

This was apparently intended as a direct
ruling of the California Supreme Court
repudiation of the 1964
in
People v. l-iorse (1964) 60 C.2d 631, which held that the
possibility of parole is essentially irrelevant to the issues the
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jury is called upon to decide, and that

inGtructin~

the jury as

to the commutation power of the governor over lifo sentences is a
"half-truth, to since that pOliler extends to sentences of death as
well.

This provision of the Briggs Initiative was unique.

None

of the other 38 states with death penalty laws mandate such an
instruction," and the Courts of 25 of those states have ruled that
the jury should not consider the possibility of pardon, parole or
cummutation.

In the fifteen years since the" death penalty was

struck down in Furman, only one state supreme court (Indiana) has
approved of an instruction allowing the jury to consider the
possibility of parole or commutation in deciding whether to
impose the death penalty.
In People v. Ramos (1982) 30 C.3d 553, the California
Supreme court held in a 6-1 decision authored by Justice
Tobriner, that the commutation instruction mandated by the Briggs
Initiative violated the due process rights guaranteed by the
Fifth, Eight and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution,
by encouraging the jury to consider an irrelevant and confusing
factor and biasing the outcome in favor of the death penalty.
This ruling was reversed "by the U.S. Supreme Court, which
held in a 5-4 decision that the instruction did not violate the
federal constitution.

California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992.

On remand, the California Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of the instruction under the State
constitution.

Actually, the intervening decisions in Carlos and

Garcia then required reversal of the special circumstances
I

finding in Ramos, but the Court addressed the penalty phase issue

\
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"for guidance both at retrial and in other casef21."

Although

.,

~,',

three of the Justices who decided Ramos I had been replaced, the

"s
I

vote was again 6-1 to strike down the Briggs Instruction, this
time as a violation of the due process guarantee of the
California constitution.

People v. Ramos (1984) 37 C.3d 136.

Ramos was followed to require the reversal of another death
penalty determination in People v. Montiel (1985) 39 C.3d 910.
An alternative holding in Montiel was that reversal of the
penalty determination was required because the trial court gave
the same "no sympathy" instruction condemned in People v. Easley
(1983) 34 C.3d 858, discussed above under 1977 death penalty law
cases.

The "no-sympathy" instruction led to reversal of still

another case tried under the 1978 Briggs Initiative in People v.
Brown (1985) 40 C.3d 512.
The Brown Court also addressed the second fundamental change
which the Briggs Initiative made in the penalty determination
procedure established by the 1977 law.

The 1977 law defined a

number of aggravating and mitigating factors which might be
relevant, and then provided that the jury "consider, take into
account and be guided by" those factors in making the ultimate
determination of the appropriate penalty.

The 1978 Briggs

Initiative went a step beyond, concluding that the trier of fact
" • . • shall impose a sentence o~ dea~h if the trier of
fact concludes that the aggravat~ng c~rcumstances
outweigh the mitigating ci:c~mst~nces: If the trier of
fact determines that the ~7t~gat~ng c~rcumstances
outweigh the aggravating c~rcumstanc7s the t:ier of
fact shall impose a sentence of conf~nement ~n state
prison for a te~~ of life without the possibility of
parole."
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Penal Coda

§

190.3

While this provioion io susceptiblo to an

interpretation that the death penalty is mandatory if a
mechanical "balancing" of aggravating and mitigating factors is
heavier on the aggravation side, the n.rown court rejected such an
inteipretation and upheld
attack.

th~

statute against constitutional

The Court noted that "each juror is free to assign

whatever moral or sympathetic value he deems appropriate to each
and all of the various factors he is permitted to consider,"
rather than mechanically counting the factors.

The word "shall,"

the Court concluded,does not require any juror to vote for death
unless he considers it the appropriate penalty under all the
circumstances.

7''''
,/

Nonetheless, the Court noted the potential for

confusion if the statute were simply read to the jury with no
further explanation.

In future trials, the Court ruled, the

scope of its discretion must be explained to juries.

In a

modification of its opinion announced January 30, 1986, the Court
indicated that a recently drafted modification of CALJIC
Instruction No. 8.84.2 would conform to its requirements.
C.3d 43ge.

41

In cases already tried where no such instruction was

given, the Court indicated it would examine, on a case by case
basis, whether "the sentencer may have been misled to defendant's
prejudice,"

Id. at 545, n.17.

The potential for confusion was underscored by a Professor
of Linguistics at U. C. Berkeley \'lho served on a jury in a capital
case.

writing in the Los Angeles Times, Professor Robin Lakoff

noted how misleading use of the word "shall" could be.
concluded,
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She

•

"Therefore, to be sure of conveying the law correctly,
the instructions should contain not only ~ but also
an addendum along these lines: 'Whero the aggravation
outweighs mitigation, you are permitted to impose tho
death penalty-but you ~ ~ required ~ QQ ~.' The
jury I served on received just such an instruction, and
voted, with full understanding, for life without
possibility of parole."
Lakoff, "Life or Death Confusion in the Law," Los Angeles Times,
Part II, p.S, Jan. 3, 1986.
since Brown, the Supreme Court has reviewed two cases to
determine whether instructions pursuant to the Briggs Initiative
misled the sentencer as to the discretion to be exercised.
both cases, a death penalty verdict was reversed.

In

In People v.

Davenport (1985) 41 C.3d 247, the jury was given an instruction
that closely tracked the language of Section 190.3, that a
sentence of death shall be imposed if the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.

The Court

found the error was compounded by two other instructional errors.
The jury was not told that other crimes must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, as required by People v. Robertson (1982) 33
C.3d 21.

And in delineating potential aggravating or mitigating

circumstances, the Court used the language of section 190.3 (k),
that they could consider "any other circumstances which
extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal
excuse for the crime."

The Court had previously noted the

potential for confusion of factor (k) in People v. Easley (1983)
34 C.3d 858, since it could be construed to exclude circumstances
that relate to the general character, family background or other
aspects of the defendant unrelated to the crime.
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since the only

'I

i

;;..

mitigation Gvidenca offord by tho defendant ralatedto the
circumstances of his upbringing, the. Court found tho
instructional errors were prejudicial.

.

In Eeople v. Walker (1985) 41 C.3d 116, the instruction that
'

the jurors ahall impose a penalty of death if aggravating
circumstances oub/e1gh mitigating circumstances was again
compounded by the factor (k) instruction.

These errors were

fully exploited in the prosecutor's closing argument, leading the
Court to conclude that sufficient prejudice was shown to warrant
reversal.
The final reversal of a death penalty determination pursuant
to the 1978 Briggs Initiative was based on 'denial of effective
counsel at the penalty phase.

In People v. Deere (1985) 41 C.3d

353, the defendant pled guilty to first degree murder charges and
admitted the special circumstance of multiple murder.

At the

penalty phase, counsel cooperated with the defendant's wish that
no mitigating evidence be pres·ented.

The Court held that the

state's interest in an accurate determination of penalty requires
counsel to present mitigating evidence even 'over the objection of
his.client.

Deere was a plain and simple case of the defendant's

. use of the death penalty to commit suicide.

The Court concluded

that while one might elect t'o sacrifice his life in atonement for
a crime, he cannot compel the state to use their resources to
take his life.

The state has its own strong interest in reducing

the risk of mistaken or inappropriate death judgments.
To sum·up, three of the five reversals of penalty
determinations pursuant to the 1978 Briggs Initiative were
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.~

,

because of instructional errors directly attributable to the
drafting of section 190.3.

It appears these provisions were

deliberately inserted to increase the probability of death
penalties being imposed beyond the 1977 death penalty law.

That

was a calculated risk with great potential to wreak havoc in the
courts.

While the Court has resolved most of the ambiguities

that are likely to recur, that action does not undo the errors
that had already been committed in many of the cases still
pending before" the Supreme Court.
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VI

conclusions and Recommendati.ons.

A review of the cases applying the 1977 death penalty law
and the 1978 Briggs Initiative suggests fe"'l areas \'1here
legislative action would be appropriate.

Indeed, there is a

grave risk that legislative "tinkering" could inject new
uncertainties into the law just at the moment most of the old
uncertainties have been removed.

While an inordinately high

number of cases had to be reversed, 65% of those reversals did
not affect the validity of the underlying convictions, but
related only to the finding of special circumstances or the
determination of penalty.
cases in "lhich

II

There is a sharp contrast between the

special circumstances" were determined under the

1977 law, 75% of which were affirmed, and cases in which "special
circumstances" \flere determined under the 1978 Briggs Initiative,
75% of which were reversed.

There is yet to be full affirmance

of a death penalty under the Briggs Initiative.

Most of the

reversals of cases tried under the Briggs Initiative are directly
attributable to the drafting of the Initiative.

contradictions,

ambiguities, ignorance of precedent, inconsistencies and
erroneous citations all abound.

The harvest of reversals we are

reaping ",as sown in November of 1978.
predictable even then.

Sadly, it was all

Many of the predictions came from

prominent legislators and prosecutors:
Sen. Orner Rains:

"Sen. Rains doubts Proposition 7 is
constitutional, because it wasn't drafted as
carefully as the present death penalty law,
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taking into account all the various, and
varying, court rulings on capital
punishment." (Ventura Co. star Free Press,
Oct. 1, 1978).
Lowell Jensen, then
District Attorney,
Alameda county;
now Deputy Attorney
.
General of the U.S.:"Prop~ 7 ~lOuld be difficult to defend from
constitutional attacks. I think the present
law is about as far as you can go in line
with supreme Court decisions." (Oakland
Tribtine, October 24, 1978).
Joseph Freitas, then
District Attorney,
"proposition 7 provides for certain
San Francisco:
'mandatory' executions and will put a very
difficult, if not impossible burden upon
juries to determine if 'aggravating
circumstances outtoleigh mitigating
circumstances' affecting the numerous
possible conditions that could determine the
choice of penalty in a given case." (.L.A.
Daily Journal, Nov. 2, 1978).
William o'Malley, then
District Attorney,
Contra costa county:"Prop. 7 is too broad to stand a court test.
It tries to cover all the bases and that's
where the trouble is." (Oakland Tribune,
Oct. 28, 1978).
Many leading newspapers, including the Los Angeles Times, Oakland
Tribune and San Francisco Chronicle, urged defeat of the Briggs
Initiative because of doubts concerning its constitutionality and
its potential for confusion.
Even a well-drafted law will be followed by a "shake-down"
period in which a large back-log of appeals will accumulate and
numerous reversals will be necessary.

As the .1981 study of

appellate reversals by the Judicial Council demonstrated, that
was our experience with the new Determinate Sentencing Law
enacted in 1977.

When the law is not well-drafted, the problem
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is only compoundod.' LowGr courts are left to gueso at how
ambiguities will be' resolved until authoritativQ' appellate
rulings are compiled.

That process will always take several

years.

/
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Recommendations

(A)

Now that the "shake-down" period is ending, it would make

sense to bring the language of the legislation into conformity
with the judicial rulings of the past ten years.

This can be

accomplished by the following amendments to Penal Code section
190.2, defining "special circumstances" warranting imposition of
a penalty of death or life without parole:

(1)

Subsection (a) (14), relating to "especially heinouE,
atrocious or cruel" murders should be repealed.

The

language was declared unconstitutionally vague, and
Subsection (a) (18), relating to murders involving
infliction of torture, is sUfficient to achieve the
purpose.

(2)

Subsection (a) (17) (ii) should be amended to read
"kidnapping in violation of Sections 207 or 209."

(3)

Subsection (a) (17) (viii) should be amended to read
"Arson in ~iolation of section 451."

(B)

No rational reason appears for the distinction in section

190.2 (a) (10) between witnesses in criminal proceedings and
witnesses in juvenile proceedings.
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The section should be amended

to include witn0seoG in juvenile proceedings.

(C)

The preclusion of guilty pleas in capital cases without the

consent of counsel in Penal Coda section 1018 is inconsistent
with the right of self-representation.

At the same time, the

state interest in accurate and appropriate imposition of death
penalties recognized in Peoplev. Deere requires participation by
counsel in the penalty phase.

section 1018 should be amended to

allow a defendant who knowingly, intelligently and competently
\ilaives counsel to enter a guilty plea at the guilt phase, but to
require the participation of counsel at the penalty phase.

(D)

The legislature should address the underlying problem of

sloppily drafted initiatives.

While most of the flaws in the

drafting o~ the Briggs Initiative were apparent before it was
enacted, the initiative process left no room for the pruning and
refining which is part of the ordinary legislative process.

The

late Professor Donald Hagman of U.C.L.A. facetiously suggested
one remedy:

make "drunken drafting" a criminal offense.

A more

realistic approach might be to establish differing threshholds in
terms of the number of signatures required to qualify an
initiative, with a lower number available if the initiative is
submitted for public hearings and redrafting before it is placed
on the ballot.

(E)

.The high number of reversals for. incompetency of defense

counsel, .combined with the fact that nearly all capital cases are

handled by appointed counool, suggosts the urgency ot tunding the
compensation for counsel in capital cases at sUfficient levels to
attract the most qualified and competent lawyers available.

!
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APPENDIX
A. AUTOMATIC AppEALS UNDER 1977 DEATH PENALTY LAW

Conviction

~

AFFIRMED 7-0

2~ Cal.Sd 103 Hil
C :tI. Rptr. 663' (1979)

~oele v. Frierson
25 Cal.3d 1,(2, 158
Cal. Rptr. 281
(1979) (Firat trial
of case #25)

3

.

D9termination
or Penalty

Of Guilt

P~ollie v. Teron

2

finding Q(
Spgcial Circumstance.

Pe.2e le v. Velat!guer;
26 Cal.3d 425 162
C al. Rptr. 306' {1980}

P~oele v. Lanehear

REVERSED 6-1
1. robbery-murder
(crime Wall committed prior to the

the 1977 death penalty legislation)

REVERSED 7-0
(D was deprived

1. robbery-murder
2. kidnap murder

of adequate and
eftective repreaentation ot counsel}.
AFFIRMED 7-0

AFFIRMED 7-0
1. robbery-murder

REVERSED 4-3
(Witherspoon error)

,2. prior murder

AFFIRMED 7-0

26 Cal.3d 814, 163
Cal. Rptr. 601

AFFIRMED 7-0
1. robbery-murder

REVERSED 6-1
(Witherspoon error)

2. prior murders

(1980) (Firat trial
of case #21)

5

_Peool
~ e v. Green
27 Cal.3d 1 16,(

AFFIRMED 7-0

REVERSED .(-3
1. robbery-murder
2. kidnap-murder
(robbery-murder special

Cal. Rptr. 1 (1980)

circumstance reversed
because the robbery was
incidental to the murder; kidnapmurder special circumstance
reversed because of improper
argument to the jury by the
prosecutor) .

. REVERSED 7-0
6

Peopl e v. Thompson
-=
27 Ca1.3d 303 165
C

AFFIRMED 7-0

'

al. Rptr. 289 (1980)

1. robbery-murder
'2. burglary-murder
(the burglary and robbery were
incidental to the murder)

7

~I e v. Jackson
28 C al.3d 264 168
C
'
al. Rptr. 603 (1980)

AFFIRMED 5-2 '

AFFIRMED 4-3
L burglary-murder
2. multiple-murder

AFFIRMED 4-3
1. no error in denying

motion for appointment
of additional counsel to argue
the penalty phaae.
2. No inadequacy of trial counsel
at the guilt phat!e
3. 1977 death penalty law is
constitutional.

8

f!!:211I!ll v, Qb~~sl
28 Cnl.3d 739, 170
Cal. Rptr. 71)8 (1931)

REVERSED 4-2
(trinl court GrNd
in eccCiptina D'a
ltUilty pl~a without
coneent of couno<ill)

1. raPtl-murdor
2. robb<try-murd,u'
~. multlple-murdor

PWQIf! v. Ha!Ii@
28 Ca1.3d 1)35, 171
Cal. Rptr. 671) (19111)

AFFIRMED 4-2

AFFIRMED 4-2
1. robbary-murdu
2. bure:lary-murdllr

i
~ I

\)

AFFIRMED 4-2
1. prf!trial publicity did not
deny ri,ht to a fair
Ilnd impartial jury.
2. f!rror, if any, in prosecutor's
elicitini admillion
that D had been convicted of
a prior felony was cured by
instruction.

10 Peoj2le v. Murtishaw

AFFIRMED 7-0

29 Cal.3d 733, 175
Cal. Rptr. 738 (1981)

AFFIRMED 7-0
1. multiple-murder

REVERSED 6-1
(trial court erred in admitting
psychiatric testimony predicting
future violence).

11 People v. Ha3kett

AFFIRMED 7-0

30 Cal.3d 841, 180
Cnl. Rptr. 640 (1982)
12 PeoQle v. HOKan

31 Cal.3d 815, Hl3
Cal. Rptr. 640 (1982)
13 PeoQle v. Stankewih.
32 Cal.3d 80, 184
Cal. Rptr. 611 (1982)

14 PeoQle v. Arcegn

32 Cal.3d 504, 186
Cal. Rptr. 339 (1982)

15 P"oQle v. Gzikowski

32 Cal.3d 580, 186
Cal. Rptr. 339 (1982)

16 PeoQle v. Robertson

AFFIRMED 7-0
1. multiple-murder

MOMle)
REVERSED 4-2
(involuntary statements
from D were admitted).

1. multiple murder

REVERSED 4-2
(trial court failed to

1. kidnap-murder

2. robbery-murder

conduct a competency
hearing}.
REVERSED 5-2
(error to admit
psychiatric testimony
based on statements made
during examination of Dto
determine competency).

1. multiple-murder ..

REVERSED 5-2
{Deprivation of D's right
to defend with counsel of
his choice deprived him of'
due process}.

1. multiple-murder

AFFIRMED 7-0

AFFIRMED 7-0

33 Cal.3d 21,188
Cal. Rptr. 77 (1982)

1. multiple-murder

2. torture-murder
3. robbery-murder
4. kidnap-murder
5. rape-murder

17 PeoRle v. EMley

34 Cal.3d 858, 196
Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983)

REVERSED 6-1
(Commutation instruction violated

AFFIRMED 7-0

AFFIRMED 7-0
1. murder for consideration
2. multiple-murder

REVERSED 4-3
{prejudicial error at the penalty
phase in failing to instruct the
jury that evidence of other crimes
could not be considered as factors
in aggravation unless they were
proved beyond a reasonable dou bt'J.
REVERSED
6-1 (Trial court erred in
informing the jury that it must
not be influenced by pity or
sympathy for D).

5-2'(tri&1 court emad in in.tructin,
tho jury under the 1978 death

&.J pi, I, EM1U

17

(continued)

18

D_

.L..e()DI,

y. Mroc.k2

311 Cal.3d 86 (1983)

.&topl. Y.

19

Fjeld!

p.nalty law, rllther thlln the 1077 Iaw.
)

REVERSED 7-0
(D wu denied etrectin
u.i.tance of coun.el by connict).

AFFIRMED 4-2

~II Cal.3d 320, 197

1. prior conviction of
cecond dei1'e. murdar

AFFIRMED 4-2

AFFIRMED 4-2

1. robbery-murder

(D.murdered th. victim willfully,
dehberately, with premeditation

aI. Rptr. 803 (1983)

20 P

and during the commision of a rob~fY
and was sane when he committed the
act).

~Ie v. Harris

REVERSED 4-2

~6 Cal.3d 36, 201

(violation of D's right
to a jury drawn from
a representative crosssection of the community).

11.1. Rptr. 782 (1984)

21 ~I e v. Lanphear

[PREVIOUSLY AFFIRMED]

1. robbery-murder
2. burglary-murder
3. multiple-murder

REVERSED 5-1

[PREVIOUSLY AFFIRMED]

(trial court erred in instructing
the jury not to
base their verdict on sympathy

~6 CaI.3d 163, 203
al. Rptr. 122 (1984)
(Retrial of case #4)

22 Peonl_

~ev.Mathon

37 Cal.3d 85 (1984)

for D).

REVERSED 4-2
(police elicited confessions
after D had invoked his
privilege against self

1. rape-murder
2. kidnap-murder
3. lewd acts with a child
under 14
4. multiple murder

incrimination) .
23~
e v. Memro
38 C a I.3d 658 214

CII.I Rptr. 832' (1985)

1. multiple murder

REVERSED 4-3
(trial court erred in
denying D's discovery motion).

REVERSED 4-2

AFFIRMED 6-0

24 P

~ev. Frank
38 Cal.3d 711 214

C I

II. •

AFFIRMED 6-0

1. murder-kidnapping

AFFIRMED 6-0

(Defense counsel could not refuse

(trial court erred in admitting
evidence obtained by overbroad
search warrant).

Rptr. 801' (1985)

2S Pe I
~ v. Frierson

REVERSED 4-2

39 Cal.3d 803 218

to honor D's expressed desire to
present diminished capacity defense
at special circumstances phase of trial)

Ca.I Rptt. 73 '(1985)
( Ret·

Mal of Case #2)

26 P

~ple v ("'C~- ..
.~

-II Ca I.3d 1 (1985)

27 P

~ v. Phillips

'HC a I.3d 29 (1985)

REVERSED 5-2

1. robbery-murder
2. murdering of police officer

(Beeman error)

AFFIRMED 6-0
AFFIRMED 6-0

1. robbery-murder

REVERSED 4-2
1. improper introduction of D's
prior criminal conduct.
2. failure to give a reasonable
doubt instruction regard'lOgo th er crime
.

r

I

B. AUTOMATIC APPEAl.S UNDER 1016 BRIGgS INITIATIVE
CoDviljti9D

QLQyill

£irujIDIj: of
Clrtum,\pnce,

~9Sil\l

people v. Rnmos
AFFIRMED 7-0
30 CrJ.!.3d 563, 180
Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982)
On Remand, 31 CaUd 136;
201 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1984).

REVERSED 7-0
1. robbery-murder

2

PeoEle v. Mozingo
34 Cal.3d 926, 196
Cal. Rptr. 212 (1983)

REVERSED 7-0
(inadequate representation of counsel)

1. rnpe-murd<!ll'
2. especially heinous, atrocious
nnd cruel.

3

Peol:!le v. Josel:!h
34 Cal.3d 938, 196
Cal. Rptr. 339 (1983)

REVERSED 1-0
(Faretta Error)

1. robbery-murder

4

Peol:!le v. Alcala
36 Cal.3d 604, 206
Cal. Rptr. 715 (1984)

REVERSED 5-1
(Admission of D's prior
offenseG WM prejudicild)

1. kidnap murder

5

People v. Whitt
36 Cal.3d 124, 205
Cal. Rptr. 810 (1984)

AFFIRMED 1-0

REVERSED 6-1
1. robbery-murder

People v. Turner
37 Cal.3d 302, 208
Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984)

AFFIRMED 6-0

People v. McDonald

REVERSED 6-0

37 CaUd 351, 208

Conviction was decreased
to second degree murder.
1. Trial Court erred in
excluding expert testimony.
2. Jury's failure to specify
the degree of murder in its
verdict rendered the conviction

-""/

(Carlos/Garcia error)

/
6

7

Cal. Rptr. 236 (1984)

REVERSED 6-0
1. burglary-murder

2. multiple murder
(Carlos/Garcia error and
the multiple murder special
circumstances could not stand
because based on invalid felonymurder special circumstances.)

!econd degree murder as a
matter of law.

1. robbery-murder

Dd.rmjo!ti2o
Of PeDl\Ur

[REVERSED 6-1
(Brii'" instruction violated
due procus))

8

Pf9pl. I, Holt
37 Cal.3d 4~, 20a
Cal. Rptr. 1547 (10tl4)

REVERSED 5-1
1. Trial court erred in
admittlnc: the t •• timony
of D', ac:compllcl;

1. robb.ry-murder

2. Trial court .rred in
admittin" 0'. prior
burilary conviction •.
3. Trial court erred in
permittin& a defen.e
witn ... to b. impeached
with prior conviction •.
9

P~Qle

v. Armendarir;

AFFIRMED 1-0

37 Cal.3d 573, 209
Cal. Rptr. 66.. (198 .. )

10

P~Qle v. Bigelow
37 Cal.3d 731, 209
CZll. Rptr. 328 (198 .. )

11 PeoEle v. Anderson

REVERSED 7-0
1. Trial Court failed to
appoint advisory coun.el
2. evidence of prior crimes
was inadmissable.

REVERSED 7-0

AFFIRMED 7-0

REVERSED 7-0
1. burglary-murder
{Carlos/Garcia error}

38 Cal.3d 58, 210
Cal. Rptr. 777 (1985)
12 PeoQle v. Bo:td

REVERSED 1-0
1. burilary-murder
2. robbery-murder
(Carlol-Garcia error)

AFFIRMED 6-0

38 Cal.3d 162, 215
Cal. Rptr. 1 (1985)

1.
2.
3.
...

kidnap-murder
robbery-murder
murder for financial gain
murder-perfecting escape

REVERSED 6-0
1. robbery-murder
(Carlos/Garcia error)

13 PeoQle v. Ha:tes
38 Cal.3d 180, 21 ..
Cal. Rptr. 652 (1985)

AFFIRMED 7-0

REVERSED 7-0
1. multiple-murder
2. robbery murder
(Carlos/Garcia error)

14 PeoEle v. Chaver;
39 CaUd 823, 218
Cal. Rptr ... 9 (1985)

AFFIRMED 6-1

REVERSED 1-0
1. robbery-murder
(Carlos/Garcia error)

15 PeoEle v. Montiel
39 Cal.3d 910, 218
Cal. Rptr. 572 (1985)

AFFIRMED 7-0

AFFIRMED 7-0
1. murder for financial gain
2. murder was especially heinous,
attrocious, and cruel
3. robbery-murder

REVERSED 1-0
(Briggs Instruction and
instruction jury not to be
swayed by mere sentiment or
sympathy both required reversal).

(Carlos/Garcia error)
16 Peo[!le v. Guerra
40 Cal.3d 377 (1985)

AFFIRMED 7-0

REVERSED 6-1
1. robbery-murder
2. kidnapping-murder
{Carlos/Garcia error}

17 PeoEle v. Brown
40 Cal.3d 512 (1985)

AFFIRMED 7-0

AFFIRMED 1-0
1. murder during rape

REVERSED 5-2
(Error to instruct
that the jury not to be
swayed by mere sentiment or
sympathy).

18 ~In

v.

Fl,\!mh'l~

AFVIR.."IED 1-0

REVEruJED 5-2
I. robb:Jry-murdu
(CarIOil/Garcia error)

REVERSED ~-2
(D pled llUilty to a
cr.pital Orr'IInSG without
the conuent of counlllll).

1. robbGry-murder
2. prior murder conviction

40 C~.3d 629 (106~)

19 e~2X11!U I, M~~21!l

-w Cnl.3d 620 (1035)

v. Hamilton
(Barnftrd Lee)
41 Ca1.3d 408 (1985)

AFFIRMED 7-0

~le v. Silberton
41 Cn1.3d 296 (1985)

AFFIRMED 7-0

REVERSED 5-2
1. robbery-murder
(Carlol/Garcia error)

22 Peo2le v. BalderatJ
41 CaUd 144 (1985)

AFFIRMED 6-1

REVERSED 5-2
1. robbery-murder
(Carloll/Garcia error)

23 Peo2le v. Hamilton
(Bill Ray)
41 Cal.3d 211 (1985)

AFFIRMED 7-0

REVERSED 4-3
1. robbery-murder
2. 2 multiple murder findings.
(Carloa/Garcia error)

21 Peol2ie v. Davenl20rt
41 Ca1.3d 247 (1985)

AFFIRMED 6-0

AFFIRMED 6-0

25 Peo2le v. Walker
41 Ca1.3d 116 (1985)

AFFIRMED 6-0

26 Pe02le v. Leach
41 Ca1.3d 92 (1985)

AFFIRMED 7-0

20

21

~eoQl0

REVERSED 5-2
1. robbery-murder

2. burttlary-murder
S. kidnapping-murder
(Carlol/Garcift error)

1. torture-murder

AFFIRMED 6-0
1. robbery-murder

REVERSED 5-1
(jury instructions on
mitigating evidence were
erroneous).
REVERSED 4-2
(jury instructions on
mitigating evidence were
erroneous).

REVERSED 5-2
1. torture murder

2. robbery murder
(Carlos/Garcia error)
27 Peo2le v. Deere

41 Ca1.3d 353 (1985)

AF'FIRMED 7-0

AFFIRMED 7-0
1. multiple-murder

REVERSED 6-1
(trial counsel was
incompetent in failing to
offer mitigating evidence at
the penalty phase).

